"Bayes' rule is one equation and three named quantities. Learn the names; the rest is plumbing."
The Equation, Once More
Bayes' rule:
P(H | E) = P(E | H) × P(H) / P(E)
Three named quantities:
- Prior P(H) — your belief about the hypothesis BEFORE seeing the evidence.
- Likelihood P(E | H) — how probable the evidence is IF the hypothesis were true.
- Posterior P(H | E) — your belief about the hypothesis AFTER updating on the evidence.
The fourth quantity P(E) (the 'evidence' or 'marginal likelihood') is the normalizing constant — it's how often the evidence shows up across all possible hypotheses, weighted by the prior. It makes the posterior sum to 1.
What Each Name Means in Plain Language
The prior is a probability distribution specified before incorporating the current evidence. It may encode substantive knowledge, a reference construction, or a hierarchical model. A frequentist procedure does not secretly become Bayesian or require an implicit prior merely because it leaves a Bayesian question unanswered.
The likelihood is one model component. A likelihood describes how the observed data vary across candidate parameter values under a model. A p-value is not itself a likelihood, and many experimental analyses use sampling distributions, estimators, or prediction rather than an explicit likelihood. It is the technically intricate part.
The posterior combines the prior and likelihood. A decision additionally needs actions, utilities or losses, constraints, and model checking; a posterior alone is not a decision rule.
Why the Prior Cannot Be Dodged
If you compute only a likelihood and stop there, you have not finished the inference. You have given the user the conditional probability of evidence under a hypothesis, but they wanted the conditional probability of the hypothesis under evidence. Without a prior, those two cannot be related. A posterior question requires a prior; a frequentist can instead answer a different, explicitly repeated-sampling question without thereby choosing a hidden uniform prior.
The discipline of Bayesian inference is the discipline of naming the prior. Once it is named, it can be argued about, criticized, refined, replaced. As long as it stays implicit, it cannot be examined. Bayesian notation makes the prior explicit, but honesty still depends on transparent modeling, diagnostics, and reporting.